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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

OUR UNEASINESS WITH POLICE UNIONS: POWER AND VOICE
FOR THE POWERFUL?
MARCIA L. MCCORMICK*
I. INTRODUCTION
When Michael Brown was shot by Officer Darren Wilson in August of
2014 and people started to talk publicly to tell the story of what happened, to
determine whether a crime had occurred, or to protest the shooting or living
conditions of African Americans in Ferguson and cities like it, the two people
in the best position to talk about what happened and why could not speak
directly to the public. As a result, several prominent voices emerged. A number
of witnesses, and the man who was with Michael Brown at the time he was
shot spoke publicly about what they saw. A number of local activists and
journalists tweeted and streamed video from the protests. Robert McCulloch,
the St. Louis County Prosecutor was the voice of the state, and St. Louis
County Police Chief Jon Belmar spoke frequently on behalf of law
enforcement, primarily connected with the protests.1
Absent were the voices of Michael Brown and Darren Wilson. It was
obvious why Michael Brown could not speak, but maybe less obvious why
Darren Wilson could not. Initially, the officer involved in the shooting was not
identified. Later when he was identified, some were concerned that he or his
family might be in danger, and that likely kept him from appearing publicly or
speaking out. Even more likely there was simply no likely reason for Wilson to
speak. As police officers know better than anyone, anything he said could
become evidence in criminal proceedings, a civil action for damages, or simply
in the court of public opinion. Moreover, anything he said could be used to
determine his fitness to remain employed, to get a job anywhere else, and to
keep any pension or other benefits he might be entitled to. Wilson had nothing
* Marcia L. McCormick is an associate professor at the St. Louis University School of Law. Her
scholarship has explored the areas of employment and labor law, federal courts, as well as gender
and the law. Additionally, Prof. McCormick is a co-editor and contributor to the Workplace Prof
Blog. Anne Blake is a third year law student at St. Louis University School of Law. Thank you to
Meredith Rogers for inviting me to write on this subject and to Anne Blake for her excellent
research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Matt Pearce, Protests again Roil Ferguson, Mo. over Michael Brown Shooting,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014, 11:14 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ferguson-policeshooting-08132014-story.html.
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to lose by keeping quiet except for the frustration that might come from not
being able to publicly defend oneself from awful things others might say.2
Wilson was not undefended, however. Often speaking in his defense, or at
least speaking about the use of force generally from the police perspective, was
Jeff Roorda, Executive Director of the St. Louis Police Officers Association.3
Roorda was extremely vocal, taking many opportunities to publicly support
Wilson and other officers, focusing on the difficult and dangerous job police
have in the face of hostility and sometimes lawless behavior. Roorda was
quoted or mentioned in hundreds of stories, national and international, about
the shooting, police use of force generally, the police response to protesters,
the situation in Ferguson, and civilian oversight of police.4 He appeared on a
number of national news programs, like The Lead with Jake Tapper on CNN,5
Anderson Cooper 360 on CNN,6 Erin Burnett Outfront on CNN,7 The Situation
Room on CNN,8 CNN Tonight,9 and a variety of other shows on CNN,10 All

2. See generally Jake Halpern, The Cop, NEW YORKER (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2015/08/10/the-cop.
3. ST. LOUIS POLICE OFFICERS’ ASS’N, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE – LODGE 68,
http://www.slpoa.org/?zone=/unionactive/view_article.cfm&HomeID=152110&page=SLPOA
(last updated Feb. 10, 2010). The St. Louis Police officer’s association is the division of the
Fraternal Order of Police that represents officers in St. Louis. Id. The lodge that represented
Wilson and other officers in the county was the Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police – Lodge 15.
See also MISSOURI FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, http://www.mofop.org/lodges/. The Fraternal
Order of Police is the union that represents police officers in Missouri. See also E. Mo. Coal. of
Police, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 15 v. City of Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Mo.
2012) (en banc).
4. Search of WestlawNext News Database, WESTLAW, next.westlaw.com (follow “News”
hyperlink; then use the quoted search parameters: “adv: (jeff /2 roorda) % (technology one or
“technology one”)” ) (returning more than 350 news stories after the shooting).
5. The Lead with Jake Tapper (CNN television broadcast Aug. 19, 2014; Nov. 21, 2014;
Nov. 25, 2014; Dec. 1, 2014; Dec. 2, 2014; Mar. 12, 2015; Mar. 16, 2015; Apr. 17, 2015; Aug. 4,
2015).
6. Anderson Cooper 360 (CNN television broadcast Nov. 25, 2014; Nov. 27, 2014; Aug.
11, 2014; Sept. 2, 2015).
7. Erin Burnett OutFront (CNN television broadcast Nov. 15, 2014; Nov. 20, 2014; Nov.
21, 2014; Nov. 25, 2014; Dec. 4, 2014; Mar. 5, 2015; Mar. 12, 2015; Mar. 16, 2015).
8. The Situation Room (CNN television broadcast Nov. 21, 2014; Nov. 24, 2014; Nov. 25,
2014; Dec. 1, 2014; Jan. 29, 2015; May 7, 2015).
9. CNN Tonight (CNN television broadcast Mar. 4, 2015; Mar. 12, 2015; Mar. 13, 2015;
Mar. 17, 2015; Mar. 20, 2015; Apr. 3, 2015; May 19, 2015; Aug. 4, 2015; Aug. 11, 2015).
10. See Newsroom (CNN television broadcast Nov. 14, 2014; Nov. 17, 2014; Nov. 25, 2014;
Dec. 1, 2014; Mar. 4, 2015; Mar. 7, 2015, Mar. 13, 2015; Mar. 15, 2015; Mar. 16, 2015; May 5,
2015; Aug. 4, 2015; Aug. 10, 2015); Special Live Event (CNN television broadcast Nov. 24,
2014); New Day (CNN television broadcast Nov. 25, 2014; Dec. 3, 2014; Mar. 12, 2015; Mar. 13,
2015; Aug. 4, 2015; Aug. 11, 2015); CNN @ThisHour (CNN television broadcast Dec. 1, 2014;
Aug. 10, 2015); CNN Legal View (television broadcast Dec. 1, 2014, Aug. 4, 2015); Smerconish
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Things Considered on NPR,11 The Today Show on NBC,12 Hannity on FOX,13
the O’Reilly Factor on FOX,14 On the Record on FOX,15 and the Kelly File on
FOX.16 He was also the subject of stories on national news programs, like All
In with Chris Hayes on MSNBC17 and the Situation Room on CNN.18 Roorda
became so outspoken and such a flashpoint for conflict, that the union
eventually replaced him as a spokesman on issues related to civilian review of
allegations of police misconduct in St. Louis.19
While Roorda was especially visible and rather controversial, police union
leaders all over the country often play a role in publicly defending officers
accused of excessive force or other misconduct. That was true in the death of
Freddy Gray in Baltimore,20 in the death of Eric Garner in New York,21 in the

(CNN television broadcast Nov. 22, 2014); CNN Reliable Sources (CNN television broadcast
Mar. 15, 2015).
11. All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 28, 2014; Sept. 25, 2014); see also
Weekend Edition (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 8, 2015).
12. The Today Show (NBC television broadcast Dec. 2, 2014).
13. Hannity (Fox News television broadcast Nov. 26, 2014), http://insider.foxnews.com/
2014/11/25/watch-hannity-takes-brown-family-attorney-daryl-parks.
14. The O’Reilly Factor (Fox News television broadcast Mar. 6, 2015).
15. On the Record (Fox News television broadcast Mar. 12, 2015; Mar. 13, 2015).
16. The Kelly File (Fox News television transcript Mar. 13, 2015).
17. All In with Chris Hayes (MSNBC News television broadcast Sept. 17, 2014; Dec. 2,
2014; Dec. 3, 2014; Dec. 4, 2014).
18. The Situation Room (CNN television broadcast Jan. 29, 2015); New Day (CNN
television broadcast Jan. 29, 2015); Early Start (CNN television broadcast Jan. 29, 2015);
Newsroom (CNN television broadcast Jan. 29, 2015).
19. Christine Byers, Controversial St. Louis Police Union Leader Muzzled when it Comes to
Civilian Review, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/
crime-and-courts/controversial-st-louis-police-union-leader-muzzled-when-it-comes/article_7fd
6dbc2-e878-59a4-bd9a-cd056f9c1476.html; Newsroom (CNN television broadcast Mar. 15,
2015).
20. E.g., John Bacon, Freddie Gray Settlement “Obscene,” Police Union Chief Says, USA
TODAY (Sept. 9, 2015, 2:18 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/09/09/balti
more-panel-approves-freddie-gray-settlement/71928226/; Colin Campbell & Justin George,
Baltimore Police Union President Likens Protests to “Lynch Mob,” BALT. SUN (Apr. 22, 2015,
10:33 PM), http://www.baltimore sun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-fop-news-con
ference-20150422-story.html; Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Police Union Blasts Commanders
in “After Action Review” of Riot, BALT. SUN (July 8, 2015, 9:26 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.
com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-fop-report-20150708-story.html.
21. E.g., NYPD Chokehold Victim Eric Garner Complicit in Own Death, Union Says,
CBSNEWS (Dec. 5, 2014, 7:21 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nypd-chokehold-victim-ericgarner-complicit-in-own-death-union-says/; Joe Tacopino, Shawn Cohen & Yoav Gonen, Union
Head Blasts City’s $ 5.9M Settlement in Eric Garner Case, N.Y. POST (July 13, 2015, 7:48 PM),
http://nypost.com/2015/07/13/city-reaches-5-9m-settlement-in-garner-chokehold-case/.
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death of Ezell Ford in Los Angeles,22 and in the death of Tamir Rice in
Cleveland.23 It was also true, although to a lesser extent, in the death of Walter
Scott in Charleston, South Carolina, in which the officer was filmed shooting
an unarmed man who was running away and appeared to then place a Taser
next to his body.24 There the union called the shooting “beyond
comprehension” but defended police generally and warned the public “not [to]
allow the professional race agitators to seize this moment to advance their
often self-serving opinions of what is wrong in South Carolina.”25
A majority of the press coverage of these high profile shootings has
focused on the most visible issues connected with the use of force by police.
All of the victims who died were Black, and many of the officers were not.
Thus, much of the outrage and protests about the shootings have focused on
concerns about race and implicit or explicit bias by police officers.26 The
“Black Lives Matter” movement was born of the sense that the shooting of
young Black men by police officers or civilian vigilantes was an epidemic.27
The use of force in these cases and others caught on film in the last few years
also highlighted training issues for police – in each of these situations, the
officer involved seemed to engage in a pattern of escalation of force and
seemed to interpret anything less than complete cooperation and servility as
aggression and resistance that had to be overcome.28 The police reaction to the
protests with tanks, tear gas, and rubber bullets made Ferguson look like a war
zone, highlighting the effects of militarization of local police funded by the
Department of Homeland Security in its zeal to fight terrorist threats, or

22. Kate Mather, LAPD Union Blasts Police Commissioners over Ezell Ford Decision, L.A.
TIMES (June 16, 2015, 4:46 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-police-commis
sion-ezell-ford-20150616-story.html.
23. Tamir Rice Case Still Divides Cleveland after Reports, CBS NEWS (Oct. 11, 2015, 4:47
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/tamir-rice-case-still-divides-cleveland-after-reports/.
24. See Al Baker, Police Unions, Facing Public Anger, Rethink How to Address Shootings,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/us/police-unions-facing-pub
lic-anger-rethink-how-to-address-shootings.html.
25. Tri-County Lodge #3 Fraternal Order of Police, Open Letter from Fraternal Order
President John C. Blackman, FACEBOOK (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/SCFOP3/
photos/a.570283016319701.148533.120522961295711/1040255622655769/?type=3&theater.
26. See, e.g., Lauren McCauley, With Nationwide Protests Against Police Brutality, Activists
Declare: “Black Spring” Has Begun, COMMONDREAMS (May 2, 2015), http://www.common
dreams.org/news/2015/05/02/nationwide-protests-against-police-brutality-activists-declare-blackspring-has.
27. See Alicia Garza, A HerStory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement,
BLACKLIVESMATTER (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.thefeministwire.com/2014/10/blacklivesmat
ter-2/.
28. See Seth Stoughton, How Police Training Contributes to Avoidable Deaths, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/police-gunshooting-training-ferguson/383681/.
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donated as a result of the drawdown in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.29
Finally, in the broader context, the structure of St. Louis’s strange proliferation
of municipalities and the way those municipalities seemed to be using low
level offenses and their police forces to harass Black and poor people was
examined to explain the large scale hostility and suspicion towards police.30
Despite the visibility of Roorda and other police union leaders, the role of
police unions in these high profile use of force cases has been the subject of
very little media attention. The New York Times, for example, reported on the
changing receptivity of the public to instinctive union responses to defend the
officers at issue at all costs.31 A column by Russ Douthat challenged the
propriety of allowing police unions and called for reform.32 The Atlantic
focused on how job security provisions in collective bargaining agreements
protect cops accused of unlawful force.33 Additionally, an article in The Nation
focused on the challenges posed by the division between police unions and
other parts of the labor movement.34 Outside of those examples, the media
covered comments by union leaders, but did not really focus on the effects of
those comments and other union efforts or on the unions as actors
themselves.35
29. See Julie Bosman & Matt Apuzzo, In Wake of Clashes, Calls to Demilitarize Police,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/15/us/ferguson-missouri-in-wakeof-clashes-calls-to-demilitarize-police.html; David Love, The Dangerous Militarization of Our
Police, CNN (May 14, 2015, 3:39 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/13/opinions/love-movebombing-anniversary/; see generally RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE
MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES (2013).
30. E.g., Stephen Deere, Ferguson Commission Tackles Municipal Courts, ST. LOUIS POST
DISPATCH (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/fergusoncommission-tackles-municipal-courts/article_34b7fb34-1eec-5703-bf6d-5ee56c45c22a.html.
31. See Baker, supra note 24; Noam Scheiber, Police Struggle with Loss of Privileged
Position, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/us/police-strugglewith-loss-of-privileged-position.html.
32. Ross Douthat, Opinion., Our Police Union Problem, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/opinion/sunday/ross-douthat-our-police-union-prob
lem.html. The New Republic countered that the law governing use of force by officers and their
relationships with prosecutors drove the inability to remove abusive officers. Brian Beutler,
Police Unions Aren’t the Problem, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 7, 2015), http://www.newrepublic.
com/article/121736/police-unions-arent-problem-local-prosecutors-are.
33. Conor Friedersdorf, How Police Unions and Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cop on the Street,
THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-policeunions-keep-abusive-cops-on-the-street/383258/.
34. Michelle Chen, Police Unions Don’t Serve the People. Can the Labor Movement Force
Them To?, THE NATION (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/police-unions-dontserve-people-can-labor-movement-force-them/.
35. See, e.g., Cory Shaffer, Cleveland Police Union Reacts to Discipline of Officers
Involved in 2012 Case, Cleveland.com (Jan. 26, 2016, 2:27 PM) (last updated on Feb. 1, 2016,
12:42 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016/01/cleveland_police_union_to_react
_to_discipline_of_officers_invovled_in_2012_chase_live_coverage.html; Nina Mandell, NYC
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Academic focus has been similar to that of the media. While there has been
significant study of the use of force by police officers, there has been virtually
no study of police unions.36 Similarly, while there has been significant study of
public sector unions37, there has been little focus on police unions in particular.
In this article, I hope to focus on some of the biggest issues related to police
unions in these kinds of cases. I will outline briefly some of the objections to
police unions generally and more specific objections to police unions in the
context of police reform. I will also highlight some opportunities for police
unions and for the public to promote reforms and better policing.
II. POLICE UNIONS
Public sector unions are a relatively recent development. The Wagner
Act excluded public sector employees, and it was not until the 1960’s that
Congress and the states began enacting statutes allowing for collective
bargaining in the public sector.39 Despite the shorter history of legal protection,
public sector unions appear to be thriving compared to unions in the private
sector. In 2014, 35.7 percent of public sector workers were in a union, whereas
only 6.6 percent of workers in the private sector were union members.40
Moreover, nearly half of local government employees were represented by a
union.41
Police officers occupy a unique social position. They are literally the arm
of the executive branch and privileged to use force to keep the peace.42 As a
result of that power, police conduct must be controlled to ensure it remains
38

Police Union Chief Calls Media Coverage of James Blake Incident ‘Unjust and Un-American,’
USA TODAY (Sept. 16, 2015, 11:39 PM), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2015/09/nyc-police-unionchief-calls-media-coverage-of-james-blake-incident-unjust-and-un-american; Nicole Norfleet,
Police Union Official Critical of ‘Disgusting Chant’ at Black Lives Matter March, STAR
TRIBUNE (Aug. 31, 2015, 11:20 PM), http://www.startribune.com/police-union-official-critical-of
-digusting-chant-at-black-lives-matter-march/323465911/.
36. Samuel Walker, The Neglect of Police Unions: Exploring One of the Most Important
Areas of American Policing, 9 POLICE PRACTICE & RES. 95, 107 (2008).
37. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1676 (1984);
Joseph Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past Thirty Years, 30
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 511 (2013).
38. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1935).
39. Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, supra note 37, at 1676–77; Slater, supra note
37, at 516–19.
40. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE USDL-15-0072,
UNION MEMBERS – 2014 (2015).
41. Id. at tbl.3 (stating that local government workers include police officers and showing
that 45.5 percent of local government employees are represented by unions).
42. HOWARD S. COHEN & MICHAEL FELDBERG, POWER AND RESTRAINT: THE MORAL
DIMENSION OF POLICE WORK 56 (1991).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

OUR UNEASINESS WITH POLICE UNIONS

53

within constitutional limitations.43 At the same time, however, because no one
including government officials is above the law, the police must be at least
somewhat independent of political influence.44 This tension between constraint
and freedom can be difficult to manage, and workplace protections for police
officers illustrate that tension.45 In some ways police officers need more
protection than other kinds of public employees, and in other ways, they
should have less protection.
One reason that police might need more ability to negotiate about working
conditions, pay, and job security is that being a police officer can be a
dangerous job. Police officers are more likely to be killed at work than people
in other professions.46 Even though the number of fatalities in 2014, 103, may
not sound high,47 the rate of illness and nonfatal injury is higher than for other
workers.48 Another reason that police officers might need more protection than
other workers is to guard against public corruption. If an officer can be forced
to act or refrain from acting because of concerns about retaliation by superiors,
politicians, or politically connected economic interests, then law enforcement
cannot work.49 Similarly, if an officer can be too easily disciplined, those
disciplinary processes might be strategically invoked by people to frustrate
enforcement as part of a defense or even organized crime strategy.
Police can bargain collectively in the vast majority of states;50 the subjects
they can bargain over vary however,51 and only two states allow police officers
to strike.52 Even where collective bargaining is illegal, employee associations,
likely either the Fraternal Order of Police or the National Association of Police
43. Id.
44. Philip Stenning, The Idea of the Political ‘Independence’ of the Police: International
Interpretations and Experiences, in POLICE AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS: WHO IS CALLING
THE SHOTS? 183, 188 (Margaret E. Beare & Tonita Murray eds., 2007).
45. See generally JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 67–70 (1996).
46. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK
HANDBOOK, POLICE AND DETECTIVES: WORK ENVIRONMENT (2014), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/
protective-service/police-and-detectives.htm#tab-3 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
47. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE USDL-15-1789,
NATIONAL CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES IN 2014 (PRELIMINARY RESULTS)
(2015).
48. SHANNON M. MALONEY, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
NONFATAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES AMONG STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT WORKERS 9
(2014) (reporting 11.3 cases per 100 police workers).
49. See Stenning, supra note 44, at 188–89.
50. MILLA SANES & JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RESEARCH, REGULATION OF
PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE STATES 5 (2014) (reporting that bargaining by
police is illegal in only five states – Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Virginia – and only another four have no statute or case law on the legality of police unions –
Alabama, Colorado, Mississippi, and Wyoming).
51. SANES & SCHMITT, supra note 50, at 7.
52. SANES & SCHMITT, supra note 50, at 9.
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Organizations,53 attempt to represent interests of employees, for example
providing legal or advocacy support or access to disability or other insurance
policies.54 Police unions are also politically powerful, often, with political
action committees that are sometimes the largest contributors to candidates for
office.55
Police can collectively bargain in Missouri, but police unions are in an odd
position in the state. The Missouri Constitution provides a right to organize and
bargain collectively for public sector workers, recognized in 2007,56 but the
public sector labor law does not cover police officers.57 Thus, departments are
required to bargain in Missouri, but the subjects of bargaining and processes
for doing so are not clearly defined.58
III. PERILS
Public policy surrounding public sector unions is somewhat conflicted.59
Collective bargaining in the public sector is looked at less like an economic
process and more as a political process.60 Government offices are not primarily
viewed as economic actors, but instead as instruments of public policy and
providers of essential services that cannot effectively be provided in the private
sector, which must be accountable to the public through the political process.61
Concerns over public employee strikes, undue influence over government
policy by unions, and the economic effects of organized public employees
made public employee unions controversial, historically.62 Unions protect
53. 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCI. 1314 (Jack R. Greene eds., 3d ed. 2007).
54. See SANES & SCHMITT, supra note 50, at 12–68 (including a table with state-by-state
information on police union bargaining).
55. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCI., supra note 53, at 1314.
56. Independence-Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 136–39
(Mo. 2007) (en banc).
57. MO. REV. STAT. § 105.510 (2000).
58. See id.
59. See Slater, supra note 37, at 512–13 (describing instability in public sector labor law
from 1980 to 2010: “Because there is so much variation in the public sector, there is no single
story of the past thirty years to tell”).
60. Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective Bargaining Distort Democracy? A
Perspective from the United States, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 277, 279–80 (2013) (citing
HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 29-30 (1974);
Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156,
1164 (1974)).
61. See generally Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/beyond-distrust-howamericans-view-their-government/.
62. See Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, supra note 37, at 1676–77; Martin H.
Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, IND. L.J. 1369, 1369–70 (2009) [hereinafter
The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law]; Daniel M. Rosenthal, Public Sector Collective
Bargaining, Majoritarianism, and Reform, 91 ORE. L. REV. 673, 681–93 (2013).
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public worker salaries and benefits when the public might be able to pay less
for those things,63 and requiring public employers to bargain over those matters
and others gives public employees access to decision makers that no other
interest group has.64 Even some supporters of public sector bargaining accept
this view that public sector bargaining may subvert the public interest and be
antidemocratic, but justify any danger of antidemocratic effect by the fact that
without it, pressure from the public will always prevail to keep wages and
benefits for public employees at exploitative levels.65
In addition to critiques that public sector unions interfere with democracy,
allowing collective bargaining in the public sector is also often portrayed as an
obstacle to effective government.66 To the extent that public sector unions
bargain for job security for members, seniority, wage scales, and staffing
levels, they are viewed as interfering with the kind of management
prerogatives that can reward the most innovative, creative, and productive
employees and penalize the lazy or incompetent.67 In addition, the obligation
of management to bargain over the effects of changes to work policies are
viewed as limitations on the ability of government to adapt efficiently to
changing conditions.68
To some extent, police unions have symbolized the worst dangers of public
sector unionization. At the beginning of the twentieth century, public
employees were beginning to join unions and seek to collectively bargain.
Union density was rising. But then the Boston Police strike of 1919
singlehandedly ended the nascent growth of the public sector labor movement
and became the singular doomsday scenario of what could happen if public
sector workers were allowed to organize; its effects even influenced President
Reagan’s handling of the illegal strike by the Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Union in 1981.69 In one evening, 1100 officers walked away from
their posts, and a night of rioting, violence, and looting followed by National

63. Daniel DiSalvo, The Trouble with Public Sector Unions, 5 NAT’L AFF. 3, 5, 7 (2010).
The claim that public employees are “overpaid” compared to those in the private sector was a
common claim used by pundits and politicians attempting to stir up resentment of public sector
unions. See Slater, supra note 37, at 537–38.
64. The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, supra note 62, at 1372.
65. See Summers, supra note 60, at 1159–61.
66. See The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, supra note 62, at 1375–82, 1384.
67. The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, supra note 62, at 1380.
68. The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, supra note 62, at 1377 (referring to TSA travel
safety protocols as an example).
69. Slater, supra note 37, at 515–16; see also Bryan J. Soukup, From Coolidge to Christie:
Historical Antecedents of Current Government Officials Dealing with Public Sector Labor
Unions, 64 LAB. L.J. 177, 180–81 (2013).
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Guard efforts to restore order caused significant damage, many injuries, and
five deaths.70 The idea of police officers striking is still a terrifying prospect.
Police unions, more than other kinds of public sector unions,71 are often
viewed as obstacles to reform, and there is a certain sense of adversary-ness
between the officers on the street and high level officials and between the
public and police.72 Police unions play a role in reinforcing the norms of the
police subculture, which may include a sense of embattled warrior73 and a
unity that prohibits testifying against officers accused of misconduct.74 This
code of silence includes efforts to prevent investigations and to provide
organized public group solidarity supporting officers accused of misconduct.75
Police unions have quite strongly opposed efforts at citizen oversight.76 Unions
also fight to keep all information related to discipline of officers secret.77 In
fact, Jeff Roorda, who was a state representative in addition to his union role,
introduced a bill in early 2014 to change the state's open meetings and records
law to keep secret any information about internal investigations of police
officers or any information about police shootings including the name of the
officer involved unless the officer has been charged with a crime in connection
with the internal investigation or shooting.78
The fact that police unions seem especially powerful as a political group
may make them also look more like obstacles to reform. To some extent,
police unions have escaped the legislative crackdowns on other public sector
unions. They were exempted from right to work laws in Michigan79 and from
prohibitions on agency shops, fair share agreements, or voluntary dues checkoff in Wisconsin.80 Many other of the new laws focused primarily on

70. JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW,
26–27 (2004).
71. See Douthat, supra note 32 (stating that teachers unions may actually be viewed as
obstacles to educational reform, but the danger posed by bad teachers seems more diffuse than the
danger posed by bad officers).
72. Douthat, supra note 32.; BRIAN A. JACKSON, RAND CORPORATION, RESPECT AND
LEGITIMACY – A TWO-WAY STREET: STRENGTHENING TRUST BETWEEN POLICE AND THE
PUBLIC IN AN ERA OF INCREASING TRANSPARENCY 1 (2015).
73. Walker, supra note 36, at 103–04; Seth Stoughton, Law Enforcement’s “Warrior”
Problem, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 225, 225 (2015).
74. Walker, supra note 36, at 102, 104.
75. Walker, supra note 36, at 102.
76. Walker, supra note 36, at 102–03.
77. Walker, supra note 36, at 106.
78. H.R. 1466, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014); Representative Jeff Roorda,
MISSOURI HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.mo.gov/member.aspx?district=113&
year=2014 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016); Jeff Roorda, Unquantifiable, 45 GENDARME 5, 5 (2015).
79. 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 349 §§ 14(4)(a)(i), (ii).
80. 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws §§ 219, 227, 276, 298. They were also exempted from many
bargaining prohibitions. See id. § 314. However, the state’s biannual budget prohibited bargaining
AND THE STATE 1900-1962, at

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

OUR UNEASINESS WITH POLICE UNIONS

57

teachers.81 The fact that police unions have escaped this crackdown on public
sector unions generally may make it look as if politicians have an interest in
avoiding reforms that unions successfully resist.
Police unions also have a somewhat checkered history on matters related to
race and sex equality, both externally, in the relationship between the police
and the public, and internally, with respect to employment of diverse officers.
The modern police union movement is grounded in resistance to civil rights; it
began or at least focused its efforts in response to the civil rights movement
and criticism of the police in the 1960’s.82 Police unions are also situated on a
race and class fault-line in the broader labor movement.83 One of the reasons
that police unions were thought to be inappropriate was that allowing police to
organize would divide their loyalty between their commanders and the union,84
and loyalty to the union could make them side with labor when called to break
up strikes.85 At the same time, police historically were used to enforce racebased laws and to target Black people who asserted their rights.86 The
indifference of the criminal justice system, including the police response,

over health insurance by law enforcement. 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws § 2409cy. In litigation over
Wisconsin Act 10, the state suggested that the reason public safety officers were given rights
other public sector unions were denied was because the public safety officers might strike. Slater,
supra note 37, at 534.
81. See Martin H. Malin, Sifting through the Wreckage of the Tsunami that Hit Public Sector
Collective Bargaining, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 533, 539–43 (2012) (discussing laws in
Tennessee, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio).
82. Walker, supra note 36, at 105; see also Liyah Kaprice Brown, Officer or Overseer?:
Why Police Desegregation Fails as an Adequate Solution to Racist, Oppressive, and Violent
Policing in Black Communities, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 757, 759, 794 (2005)
(arguing that perceptions of Black communities about police are a result of police practices rather
than simply a lack of Black police officers).
83. See generally Charlotte Garden & Nancy Leong, “So Closely Intertwined”: Labor and
Racial Solidarity, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1135, 1138–39, 1177 (2013) (explaining that
organized labor has a history of racial exclusion, but that exclusion has not been universal, and
organized labor also a history of collaboration with civil rights groups and has benefitted workers
of color as well).
84. Joseph Slater, Homeland Security vs. Workers’ Rights? What the Federal Government
Should Learn from History and Experience, and Why, 6 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 295, 330 (2013).
85. Joseph Slater, Public Workers: Labor and the Boston Police Strike of 1919, 38 LAB.
HIST. 7, 12 (1997).
86. See James B. Comey, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Hard Truths: Law
Enforcement and Race, Address at Georgetown University (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/
news/speeches/hard-truths-law-enforcement-and-race (describing law enforcement’s role in
enforcing the status quo of racial insubordination as the “cultural inheritance” of modern
officers).
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towards women involved in sexual and intimate partner violence, and the high
incidence of domestic violence by officers is also well documented.87
Internally, the history is checkered as well. Just like for many other
professions, police forces, where there were any Black officers, were
segregated well into the twentieth century, and women of all colors were
excluded.88 Moreover, while research has shown little significant difference in
the way that officers of different racial groups or different sexes behave on the
street, women seem to be significantly less likely to be involved in serious
misconduct, repeated misconduct, or the subject of citizen complaints.89
Finally, police unions seem, at times, to magnify racial tensions. Whitedominated police unions have brought many reverse discrimination suits,
challenging affirmative action hiring plans, or simply challenging hiring that
results in more minorities being hired.90 Furthermore, rhetoric surrounding
communities of color, labelling young Black men as “thugs,” accusing
peaceful protesters or Black Lives Matter activists as wanting police to be
killed,91 only heighten the salience of race. African-American officers have
their own professional associations even though technically they are also
represented by the same union as white officers, and those professional
organizations sometimes speak out against positions taken by white-dominated
police unions.92
In short, although police work can be dangerous and officers need to be
protected from improper influence so that they can do their jobs, that
protection comes with some costs. Those costs may seem especially high when
persistent social gaps are evident in a community. The structure of the job and
the legal limits on bargaining further exacerbate this. Police interactions are
often by nature high conflict,93 and that conflict can lead to violence. Police
policies are set at the top, not usually through collaboration with the rank and
87. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 15–16 (1987); SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND
MALE VIOLENCE 157–61 (1982); see generally SUSANNA HOPE & ALEX ROSLIN, POLICE WIFE:
THE SECRET EPIDEMIC OF POLICE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2015).
88. See generally, W. Marvin Dulaney, Black Police in America, in BLACKS IN THE
DIASPORA (Indiana Univ. Press ed., 1996); DOROTHY MOSES SCHULZ, FROM SOCIAL WORKER
TO CRIMEFIGHTER: WOMEN IN UNITED STATES MUNICIPAL POLICING (PRAGER ed., 1995).
89. Walker, supra note 36, at 104.
90. Walker, supra note 36, at 106.
91. See Matt Pearce, “Dead Cops . . . That’s What They Want,” Says Police Union’s Jeff
Roorda, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2014, 12:54 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-fergusonjeff-roorda-20150312-story.html.
92. Walker, supra note 36, at 104.
93. See Joseph J. Hurrell, Jr. & William H. Kroes, Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety &
Health, Stress Awareness, in JOB STRESS AND THE POLICE OFFICER 234, 238, 241–42 (1975)
(arguing that the police subculture helps reduce the stress officers face); Ivan Y. Sun, A
Comparison of Police Field Training Officers’ and Nontraining Officers’ Conflict Resolution
Styles: Controlling Versus Supportive Strategies, 6 POLICE Q. 23, 24 (2003).
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file.94 For example, in the early twentieth century, police reform focused on
professionalization imposed in an authoritarian, top-down manner, and little
has changed.95
Public sector bargaining law institutionalizes this preference by prohibiting
bargaining over policies.96 By prohibiting bargaining over public policy, public
sector bargaining law allows unions not to take responsibility for implementing
those policies.97 It further limits unions to bargaining over things like wages
and working conditions, creating an adversarial dynamic with management
imposing policies that the unions do not agree with (because they were not
allowed to help form them) and negotiating technical ways to protect public
employees from those policies or at least negative effects of them, in a way
that ultimately may undermine or frustrate the policies.98 In other words, “the
law has channeled public employee unions away from investing in the risks of
the public enterprise and toward insulating their members from those risks.
Unions have done such an effective job in their channeled role that their
collective bargaining agreements can impede effective government.”99
Especially relevant for police unions, they have generally been left out of
discussions about accountability and citizen oversight despite
recommendations that they be included to result in better policies and
support.100
IV. PROMISE
Although police unions are frequently criticized, the effects of police
unions on innovation in policing, accountability of officers, or policecommunity relations have not been studied much.101 Discussions in the legal
literature about the way that police culture contributes to misconduct or efforts
to stymie reform mention unions mostly in passing, without considering them
separate from law enforcement officials.102 To the extent that police unions

94. Todd Wuestewald & Brigitte Steinheider, Shared Leadership: Can Empowerment Work
in Police Organizations?, 73 THE POLICE CHIEF (Jan. 2006), http://www.policechiefmagazine.
org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=789&issue_id=12006.
95. Walker, supra note 36, at 99.
96. See The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, supra note 62 at 1389–90.
97. The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, supra note 62, at 1389–90.
98. The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, supra note 62, at 1389–91; see also Walker,
supra note 36, at 100 (describing how bargaining over assignments can interfere with effective
policing).
99. The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, supra note 62, at 1391.
100. Walker, supra note 36, at 103.
101. Walker, supra note 36, at 96.
102. See e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 481, 512 n.364, 538, 539 n.541 (2004) (mentioning unions four times in a
nearly 100-page law review article).
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have power to shape the culture of a department, imagine how effective they
could be if harnessed for reform.103 Yet harnessing police unions has not been
seriously entertained by reformers very often. In fact, a study of structural
reform litigation instituted by the U.S. Department of Justice fails to even
mention unions as having any role in instituting reform.104 Reformers and
researchers may generally be silent about police unions because unions
themselves do not seem to be seeking a cooperative place at the table. In short,
there is little evidence to suggest that police unions actually have been
involved in efforts at reform, either as an effort of the union or reformers.
There have been calls, though, to increase police union participation in federal
police reform efforts,105 and in other efforts at democratic policing.106 And at
least occasionally, unions have supported reform efforts.107
The biggest example is the recent effort to reform policing in Cincinnati. In
that city, on April 7, 2001, a white police officer shot an unarmed black
man.108 Protests and riots lasted for several days.109 The Mayor of Cincinnati
requested that the Department of Justice review the police department's uses of
force, and after the investigation, entered into an agreement.110 The parties
involved in reaching the agreement were not just the DOJ and the city,
however; the police union was also involved in the negotiated settlement that

103. See generally POLICE REFORM FROM THE BOTTOM UP: OFFICERS AND THEIR UNIONS AS
AGENTS OF CHANGE (Monique Marks & David Sklansky eds. 2012).
104. Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99
MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1376–77 (2015) (stating that courts have refused union requests to intervene
in structural reform litigation and regularly allow negotiations exclusively between the
departments and the DOJ).
105. Elliot Harvey Schatmeier, Reforming Police Use-of-Force Practices: A Case Study of
the Cincinnati Police Department, 46 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 539, 581–82 (2013)
(attributing success of Cincinnati reforms in part to inclusion of police union as stakeholder);
Kami Chavis Simmons, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 520–25, 526–41, 545–46 (2008)
(describing federal hostility to at least one union effort to be involved in the consent decree
process and calling for greater union involvement as a way to protect legitimate interests and
ensure union support of reforms).
106. Monique Marks & Jenny Fleming, The Right to Unionize, the Right to Bargain, and the
Right to Democratic Policing, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 178, 178 (2006).
107. Steve Wilson & Kevin Buckler, The Debate over Police Reform: Examining Minority
Support for Citizen Oversight and Resistance by Police Unions, 35 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 184, 188
(2010) (quoting a letter from the Police Officer’s Association of Columbia, Missouri, in favor of
citizen review).
108. All Things Considered: Race Relations in Cincinnati (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 1,
2001), http://www.npr.org/programs/atc/features/2001/nov/cincinnati/011101.cincinnati.html.
109. Id.; Alana Semuels, How to Fix a Broken Police Department, THE ATLANTIC (May 28,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/cincinnati-police-reform/393797/.
110. Department of Justice Agreement, Background, CITY OF CINCINNATI, http://www.cincin
nati-oh.gov/police/department-references/department-of-justice-agreement/ (last visited Mar. 29,
2016).
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resulted.111 Police unions often object when a city negotiates with the DOJ at
least partially because they believe that consent decrees will "complicate patrol
work, increase paperwork, increase oversight, reduce officer discretion and
autonomy, and increase punishment for practices that the union considers
'good police work.'"112 According to one researcher, the involvement of the
union in this agreement helped that agreement lead to dramatic improvement
with less use of force, use of less serious forms of force, and a drop in citizen
complaints.113 Reforms were not quick, the union was not always seen as truly
supporting the reforms, and Cincinnati is not perfect.114 Still, there is
significant commitment to collaboration that remains.115
Calls for union participation often focus on the need for stakeholder
support and commitment to the solutions, but that conceives of union
involvement going in only one direction, still from the top-down.116 Unions
bring more to the table, however. They can help craft and implement solutions
that will be more effective to reform police culture and change officer
behavior.117 Unions have a large role in shaping the culture of a department,
and they can help connect officers with the communities they police in.118 The
interests of officers as workers and the interests of community members often
align, in fact.119 Consider the Mission Statement of the Fraternal Order of
Police, which exists in order to:
“[S]upport and defend the Constitution of the United States; to inculcate
loyalty and allegiance to the United States of America; to promote and foster
the enforcement of law and order; to improve the individual and collective
proficiency of our members in the performance of their duties; to encourage
fraternal, educational, charitable and social activities among law enforcement
officers; to advocate and strive for uniform application of the civil service
merit system for appointment and promotion; to support the improvement of

111. Schatmeier, supra note 105, at 556–59.
112. Schatmeier, supra note 105, at 551 (citing Joshua M. Chanin, Negotiated Justice: The
Legal, Administrative, and Policy Implications of ‘Pattern or Practice’ Police Misconduct Reform
310 (Jul. 6, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/237957.pdf; Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Just., to Joseph Maturo, Jr., Mayor, East Haven, CT, 19–20 (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.justice.
gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthaven_findletter_12-19-11.pdf (noting union bulletins calling
cooperators ‘rats’ and threatening union comments during the investigation).
113. See Schatmeier, supra note 105, at 541, 581–82.
114. See Semuels, supra note 109 (describing one officer’s experience leaving the union and
then rejoining once both the city and union leadership changed and new leaders seriously
embraced reform).
115. Semuels, supra note 109.
116. See Schatmeier, supra note 105, at 556–57.
117. See Schatmeier, supra note 105, at 549.
118. See Marks & Fleming, supra note 106, at 186–87.
119. Semuels, supra note 109.
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the standard of living and working conditions of the law enforcement
profession through every legal and ethical means available; to create and
maintain tradition of esprit de corps insuring fidelity to duty under all
conditions and circumstances; to cultivate a spirit of fraternalism and mutual
helpfulness among our members and the people we serve; to increase the
efficiency of the law enforcement profession and thus more firmly to establish
the confidence of the public in the service dedicated to the protection of life
120
and property.”

Several of the items in this statement highlight how the union’s interests
could complement reform efforts, especially those focused on improvement of
officer performance, the encouragement of engagement with the community in
more than one item, and improvement of the standard of living and working
conditions for officers.121 Alignment is not inevitable, but performance can
easily encompass things like problem-oriented policing,122 and encouraging
educational activities and efficiency can also promote training. Cultivating a
true spirit of mutual helpfulness and fraternalism with the community served
could easily encompass real connections, breaking down us versus them
barriers.123 Improvement of the standard of living and working conditions for
officers will help to attract and retain well qualified people.124
Working conditions for officers are inextricably connected to community
interests.125 Union concerns about insufficient staffing levels or long work
hours for officers protect communities (as well as officers) to ensure not only
enough law enforcement to serve their needs, but also officers who are healthy
and able to perform well.126 Even the supportive role of unions may play a
valuable role in keeping police officers healthy and able to perform at high

120. Mission Statement, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, https://www.fop.net/CmsPage.aspx?
id=18 (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
121. Id.
122. See Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem Oriented Approach, 25 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 236 (1979) (defining problem oriented policing in 1979 as including study and
involvement of the community by police to adopt a problem solving approach to crime and crime
prevention); see also About CPOP, CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING, http://www.pop
center.org/about/?p=whatiscpop (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
123. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, IACP NATIONAL POLICY SUMMIT ON COMMUNITYPOLICE RELATIONS: ADVANCING A CULTURE OF COHESION AND COMMUNITY TRUST 11 (2015).
124. CHRISTOPHER KOPER, ET AL., HIRING AND RETENTION ISSUES IN POLICE AGENCIES:
READINGS ON THE DETERMINANTS OF POLICE STRENGTH, HIRING AND RETENTION OF
OFFICERS, AND FEDERAL COPS PROGRAM 45 (2001).
125. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT 61 (2015)
(hereinafter FINAL REPORT).
126. Jim Redden, Police Union: Survey Says Officer Morale, Faith in Leadership Low,
PORTLAND TRIB. (Jan. 12, 2016, 4:38 PM), http://portlandtribune.com/pt/9-news/288681-165819
-police-union-survey-says-officer-morale-faith-in-leadership-low.
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levels.127 For example, union and individual officer involvement in training is
an opportunity for departments to reduce the kinds of stressors that may lead to
more conflict.128 Training, and in fact being a training officer, has been found
to reduce the likelihood of an officer engaging with individuals coercively.129
V. CONCLUSION
The protests that have followed high profile shootings have suggested that
the relationship between many police departments and at least the Black
community is broken. Non-white people have far less confidence that the
police can protect them from violent crime130 and most people think that the
police do not treat people of all races equally.131 There are fractures within
communities and between particular communities and the police as an
entity.132 The recognition of this problem prompted President Obama to sign
an executive order establishing the Task Force on 21st Century Policing.133
That task force was charged with identifying recommendations for how
policing practices can promote safe communities while building public trust.134
Interestingly, the recommendations of that report incorporated a number of
ways increased involvement of unions would lead to reform, but mentioned
unions only rarely.135
For example, one of the recommendations was that “[l]aw enforcement
agencies should promote legitimacy internally by applying the principles of
procedural justice,” and union leadership ought to be involved in policy
development.136 Another provided that “[l]aw enforcement should be

127. See Mission Statement, supra note 120.
128. See Hurrell & Kroes, supra note 93, at 243.
129. Sun, supra note 93, at 36–37, 41–45. The same study showed that the amount of force
used was the same regardless of whether it was trainers or regular officers using force.
130. Justin McCarthy, Nonwhites Less Likely to Feel Police Protect and Serve Them, GALLUP
(Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179468/nonwhites-less-likely-feel-police-protectserve.aspx.
131. Few Say Police Forces Do Well in Treating Races Equally, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug.
25, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/08/25/few-say-police-forces-nationally-do-well-intreating-races-equally/; Jens Manuel Krogstad, Latino Confidence in Local Police Lower than
Among Whites, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/20
14/08/28/latino-confidence-in-local-police-lower-than-among-whites/.
132. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 9.
133. Exec. Order No. 13,684, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,865–66 (Dec. 18, 2014).
134. FINAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 5.
135. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 125. A number of representatives from the
Fraternal Order of Police participated in the listening sessions, submitted testimony, or otherwise
supported the work of the task force. FINAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 14 n.19, 71–78. However,
the word “union” was mentioned only five times. FINAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 6, 14, 35, 61,
62.
136. FINAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 14.
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encouraged to explore more flexible staffing models” as a way to promote
work-life balance and encourage retention.137 Unions were mentioned in
connection with collaboration to develop policies for the uses of new
technology.138 Finally, two entire “pillars” of the report were focused on areas
unions could play a big role in: training and education and officer wellness and
safety.139
Like President Obama, Governor Jay Nixon established a commission to
study the social and economic conditions underlying the unrest in the St. Louis
region after the shooting of Michael Brown.140 The Ferguson Commission held
hearings and issued a report in the fall of 2015 making a number of policy
recommendations, but also providing a narrative to put those recommendations
into context.141 These recommendations, like the Task Force’s report, create
room for including the police union as a partner, but there is no mention at all
of that union explicitly.142 The first recommendation section of the report
focuses on police reform, emphasizing reform to the use of force policies,
changed training for officers, and a change to department cultures.143 One area
that both the President’s task force and the Ferguson Commission focused on
that could be viewed as either public policy or a staffing/assignment matter
was the use of officers to issue tickets as a way to raise revenue or for any
other reason not directly related to improving public safety.144
The recommendations on changing police culture, training, and practices
were reiterated in a number of “calls to action,” specific policy changes
advocated as next steps by the commission.145 Community oriented policing
and ways of building common community were specifically recommended, but
no mention was made of the police union.146 Additional calls to action focused
on developing policies about the use of new technology, and although
soliciting input from officers was recommended to help law enforcement
agencies evaluate the effectiveness of technology, that was the only mention of
137. FINAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 18.
138. FINAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 35.
139. FINAL REPORT, supra note 125, at 51–70. The implementation recommendations also
suggested collaborating with unions by charging the Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services to “[p]rovide support to . . . national rank and file [police] organizations to encourage
them to implement task force recommendations.”
140. 40 MO. REG. 5 (Jan. 2, 2015).
141. See generally THE FERGUSON COMM’N, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON: A PATH
TOWARD RACIAL EQUITY 10–12 (Positive Change, 2015), apps.stlpublicradio.org/fergusoncommission-priorities/assets/report.pdf (hereinafter Ferguson Commission Report).
142. See generally Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141.
143. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 24–29.
144. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 32–35; FINAL REPORT, supra note 126,
at 26–27.
145. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 63–65, 76–77, 80.
146. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 96–97.
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officer input, and the union was not mentioned at all.147 Specific calls to action
recommended instituting peer review of critical incidents and ensuring mental
health services and other supports for officer well-being, with no reference to
the police union.148
Particularly because of the fragmented nature of the municipal structure of
the St. Louis region and the resulting fragmentation of police functions,149
enlisting the help of the police union to be a partner in reforming police culture
and a demand for training could make those recommendations more
successful. It is possible, though, that the outspokenness of police union
leaders, especially Jeff Roorda, in the wake of the protests and at some of the
commission meetings made any explicit inclusion of the union untenable.150
Although they may sound critical, these observations about these reports
are really not meant as a criticism, but merely to highlight a missed
opportunity or room for future opportunities by union leaders and reformers. If
the police unions in St. Louis and St. Louis County could become partners in
efforts to reform our region’s policing and to address the social and economic
forces underneath some of the conflict, real and lasting change would be more
likely.

147. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 70.
148. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 84.
149. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 33–34.
150. Ferguson Commission Report, supra note 141, at 180 (listing the President of the
Missouri Fraternal Order of Police as one of the Ferguson Commission members). His inclusion
speaks to potential unpublicized collaboration with the police union that led to the Commission’s
report.
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